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Religion, Nationality, and
Empathetic Responses to Refugees
Reed Rasband

Introduction

Recent years have witnessed a dramatic surge in refugees seeking asylum throughout the developed world. While many of these asylum seekers originate from war-torn
countries in the Middle East, large numbers have also left countries in Africa, Central
America, and Southeast Asia. Contentious national responses to this surge have pitted
supporters of refugee resettlement against those who express concerns over national
security, vetting procedures, and threats to national cultural unity. In the UK, public discourse about refugee resettlement has been accompanied by rising rates of Islamophobic
incidents (Adesina and Marocico 2015; Shepherd 2016; Batchelor 2017).
In these conditions, some opinion groups circulate anxiety-provoking information
about refugees, while at the same time many media outlets choose to run stories portraying refugees as empathy-deserving victims of circumstance. Most research, however,
focuses on the former and not the latter (Brader et al. 2008; Gadarian and Albertson 2014;
Albertson and Gadarian 2015). This leaves us with much less certainty about whether
empathetic media effectively shifts readers’ attitudes toward refugee policies. We also do
not know if these appeals are effective for the population as a whole (versus only a subset) or if appeals about certain types of refugees are more effective than others.
To answer these questions, I implement a survey experiment that exposes UK residents to an empathetic article about refugees, with descriptions that varied the refugees’
religion and national origin. This experiment not only fills the current gap in knowledge
about empathetic outgroup portrayals but also clarifies whether prejudice against certain
immigrant groups reflects their religion or national origin by concurrently manipulating
both. It also accounts for variations in response among individuals with differing degrees
of pre-existing outgroup antipathy by measuring respondents’ attitudes before treatment.
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I find that empathetic media appeals about refugees are effective in generating
empathy and shifting policy opinions for most individuals but hardly influence individuals with strong prior feelings of antipathy toward refugees. For UK residents overall,
opinions are particularly intransigent when considering Muslim refugees. Articles about
Christian refugees dampened active opposition (willingness to send a letter about the
issue to a respondent’s MP) among most people, and articles about non-Christian refugees motivated supportive action among individuals with little prior outgroup antipathy.
Thus, empathetic appeals are ineffective in swaying the citizens who are perhaps their
most important target: strongly prejudiced individuals.

Citizen Responses to Empathetic Appeals

Political psychologists frequently point to affect or emotion as determinant of political attitudes. In particular, a growing set of recent research has explored the connection
between emotions and immigration attitudes, of which refugees are a subset. Research
has shown that different immigrant ethnicities elicit differing levels of anxiety from
Americans and Spaniards (Brader et al. 2008; Igartua and Cheng 2009). Anti-immigrant
media can encourage negative feelings, such as anxiety or anger, which then encourages
restrictive policy attitudes, while pro-immigrant media induces feelings such as sympathy and enthusiasm, which then discourages restrictive attitudes (Verkuyten 2004;
Brader et al. 2008; Iguartua and Cheng 2009; Lecheler et al. 2015). However, experimental
research into how positive emotions, such as empathy, influence support for immigration
has been less extensive. Verkuyten (2004), Lecheler et al. (2015), and Adida et al. (2017) are
among the few articles that take this approach directly. This lack of attention is surprising given the rising level of empathetic immigrant/refugee appeals currently promulgated through traditional and social media. These appeals are common, yet we have little
knowledge of whether they are effective in influencing the American public.
Empathy is an emotional response defined as “the act of perceiving, understanding,
experiencing, and responding to the emotional state and ideas of another person” (Barker
2008, quoted in Gerdes et al. 2010) or “the other-focused, congruent emotion produced by
witnessing another person’s suffering” (Batson et al. 1987). Generally, empathy is measured by self-report measures, where people report how strongly they are feeling a set
of related emotions, such as compassion, sympathy, or tenderness (Batson et al. 2002,
1997; Gerdes et al. 2010). Typical experimental designs expose individuals to information
portraying other people in emotional situations, with the expectation that subjects will
absorb or reflect that same emotional state (Eisenberg and Miller 1987). Some authors also
use exercises that ask respondents to imagine themselves in the place of another person,
a treatment that perhaps adheres more closely to definitions of empathy as a concept but
drifts away from the sorts of stimuli citizens would encounter in an everyday setting
(Adida et al. 2017).
Before considering how empathetic appeals may change public opinion and political behavior, we must first establish that they actually provoke an empathetic emotional
response. If they do, the following expectation would hold:
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H1) Individuals exposed to media that presents refugees in an empathetic light will feel more
empathy than people who are not.
Simply feeling an emotion, such as empathy, in response to media about an outgroup does not guarantee that other variables, such as policy opinions and political
behavior, will also change. Still, research has shown that these outcomes often do
change in response to emotion-generating stimuli. For example, studies show that
enthusiasm increases voting, anxiety increases political learning, and anger increases
campaign involvement (Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Valentino et al. 2011). Anxiety
increases people’s propensities to seek further information about immigration threats,
to trust certain political actors, and to favor restrictive immigration policies (Brader et
al. 2008; Gadarian and Alberson 2014; Albertson and Gadarian 2015). These studies
portray emotions as mediating variables between stimuli (news media or campaign ads
about immigration) and public opinion or behavior around immigration issues.
It follows that empathetic appeals may also be effective in shifting these other
outcomes. After all, research on empathy in non-political contexts has yielded results
showing that empathetic treatments encourage prosocial behaviors, such as helping others, while also improving perceptions of stigmatized outgroups (Coke et al.
1978; Eisenberg and Miller 1987; Batson et al. 1987; Batson et al. 2002, 1997). “Taking the perspective of a person in need tends to increase one’s empathic emotional
response [and] empathic emotion in turn increases motivation to see that person’s
need reduced” (Coke et al. 1978). Within political science, Bansak, Hainmueller, and
Hangartner’s (2016) findings that citizens are more likely to approve hypothetical refugee applications if the refugee has experienced trauma, such as torture or the death
of family members, also suggests that empathy can change attitudes and behavior.
Adida et al. (2017) found that empathy treatments were effective in promoting inclusionary attitudes toward refugees and encouraging political action in favor of refugees,
at least among certain subsections of the U.S. population.
If empathetic appeals indeed are effective in generating prosocial attitudes and
behaviors toward refugees, the following expectations would hold in addition to the
hypothesized relationship between these appeals and feeling empathy itself (H1):
H2) Individuals who encounter empathetic media treatments about refugees will (a) be more
likely to hold opinions supporting open refugee policies and (b) will be more likely to act in
support of those opinions.
Up to this point, the hypotheses have implied a uniform treatment effect across
all individuals, yet there is reason to question that assumption. A recent experimental
study that asked individuals to reject or deny hypothetical asylum applications found
that 9 percent of European respondents rejected all applicants, regardless of their skillset or experienced vulnerabilities (Bansak et al. 2016). Adida et al. (2017) also noted a
strong backlash against empathetic refugee appeals among sections of the U.S. populace. These findings indicate the presence of a subset of the population who dislike
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refugees as a group. It is reasonable to suppose that emotional responses to sympathetic
portrayals of refugees and other outgroups might differ for this subset.
There are several approaches to explaining how attitudes may form in this case.
Theories of motivated reasoning indicate that existing affect continues to influence
individuals’ appraisals of new information (Redlawsk 2002; Gadarian and Albertson
2014). In this vein, various studies found that people with strong prior attitudes have
greater difficulty processing concepts that they find affectively incongruent, are more
skeptical of such material and tend to argue against messages that do not match their
existing feelings (Lodge and Taber 2005; Lodge and Taber 2013; Taber and Lodge
2006). For these people, new empathetic information about refugees may be harder
to incorporate into their existing beliefs and may generate counterarguments contradicting the intended message, proving less effective in changing opinions about refugee policy. This effect is similar to that predicted by Zaller’s Receive-Accept-Sample
(RAS) model, which posits that individuals are less likely to accept new information
that is inconsistent with their prior beliefs (1992).
Another potential explanation for the hard-to-move attitudes among people with
strong outgroup biases is that empathy may trigger distressing emotions as well (Eisenberg et al. 2014). Generally, political psychologists have incorporated this potential for
distress into their theories through the concept of dissonance, a discordant emotional
response that arises when people encounter information about an outgroup that contradicts their core beliefs or existing ideals about themselves, their own in-group,
or an out-group (Gubler 2016; Gubler et al. 2016). These feelings might be generated, for example, if an individual encounters evidence portraying her own group as
violent, or information portraying a stigmatized outgroup positively (Ibid.). Citing
Harmon-Jones, Amodio, and Harmon-Jones (2009), Gubler suggests that dissonant
feelings might be especially common “when the cognitive inconsistency suggests a
new ‘action tendency’ that an individual is loath to adopt—e.g. an individual feels like
he needs to act differently as a result of the new information but knows that behavior
change will be costly or difficult” (2016). In this situation, it may prove more comfortable for the receiver simply to reject the new information or even generate self-justifying arguments that strengthen his or her own attitudes against the outgroup (Ibid.).
Whether we approach this issue from the angle of motivated reasoning or dissonance, the expected result is the same: Individuals with strong negative affect toward
refugees (outgroup antipathy) will be less likely to change their opinions about refugee policies than other individuals. Inasmuch as empathetic media provokes either
phenomenon in these individuals, they may become more likely to support closed
refugee policies and to reveal those attitudes in their political behavior.
H3) Individuals will feel more empathy and exhibit stronger opinions and action
supporting pro-refugee policies as their level of prior outgroup antipathy decreases.
In addition to variation in treatment effects across different types of individuals, it
is probable that treatment effects will also vary for different types of refugees. Studies
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of group attitudes such as prejudice or in-group centrism often find that these attitudes
also relate to attitudes about specific outgroups (Brader et al. 2010; Valentino et al. 2013;
Hutchings and Wong 2014; Gubler 2016; Gubler et al. 2016). Social identity theory suggests that, within specific cultures, some group attributes are more salient markers of
in-group/outgroup categorization and comparison than others (Tajfel and Turner 1979).
Because of this, we might expect empathetic appeals to be especially ineffective for highantipathy individuals considering refugees whose religious, ethnic, or other characteristics particularly set them apart from the cultural norms of the receiving nation.
A large body of recent research in the U.S. and Europe has investigated how attitudes toward refugees and immigrants vary according to immigrant characteristics.
These studies have established that receiving populations consistently prefer the immigration of high-status, educated, and skilled individuals who speak the local language
instead of comparatively low-status individuals, who perhaps may have greater difficulty assimilating into the new culture (Harell et al. 2012; Iyengar et al. 2013; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015; Bansak et al. 2016; Ostfeld 2017). Investigation of cultural
factors, such as national origin and religion, generally uncovers bias against Middle
Easterners and against Muslims (Igartua and Cheng 2009; Adida et al. 2010; Adida et
al. 2017; Harell et al. 2012; Iyengar et al. 2013; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015; Bansak
et al. 2016; Adida et al. 2017).
Most of these experiments only vary one or two immigrant traits at a time, making
it difficult to parse out which characteristics provoke differing responses (Hainmueller
and Hopkins 2015; Bansak et al. 2016). This seems to be an especially relevant concern
for generating conclusions about cultural cues like national origin and religion. Some
studies look only at religion without looking at national origin (generally Muslim versus Christian) (Adida et al. 2010; Adida et al. 2017), while others only look at national
origin without separating religion (Sniderman et al. 2004; Harell et al. 2012; Iyengar et
al. 2013; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015). Some authors have suggested religious stereotypes are the salient characteristics that provoke hostility toward immigrants from
the Middle East but acknowledge that no clear conclusions on this issue are possible
without experimentally manipulating both religion and national origin (Sniderman et
al. 2004; Iyengar et al. 2013).
Bansak et al. (2016) is one of the only studies that manipulates both of these variables, in the context of a conjoint experiment asking Europeans to evaluate asylum seekers for admittance. They noted minor differences in asylum acceptance rates between
countries of origin but significantly lower acceptance for Muslims vis-a-vis Christians.
In the present study, I will further elucidate the ambiguity between religious discrimination and national origin discrimination present in the existing literature. Following the general expectations of the authors above, I also expect that most ill will felt
toward Middle Easterners actually reflects religious bias against Muslims, not concerns
about a specific country of origin.
149

SIGMA
This hypothesis seems consistent with growing levels of Islamophobic incidents
in the UK (Adesina and Marocico 2015; Shepherd 2016; Batchelor 2017) and would
match the findings of Bansak et al. (2016). Furthermore, Tajfel reports that multigroup
membership and overlapping social identities can help to break down discriminatory
attitudes toward an outgroup (1982). Religion is a social identity category that can either
associate refugees with an overlapping in-group trait (Christianity in the British context)
or further differentiate the refugee outgroup from the ingroup. The degree to which citizens categorize refugees as an outgroup then determines their receptiveness to empathetic appeals about refugees. Refugees’ nationality, in contrast, is a category that few
British residents would share (or perhaps even recognize), making variation in national
origin unhelpful for moderating identity categorizations when all other traits are held
equal or when other, more familiar categories are referenced.
In the context of empathetic media accounts, Islamophobic bias would be manifest
by less significant changes in opinion and behavior outcomes after respondents consider Muslim refugees than when they consider other religious groups. If this hypothesis
holds, religious differences will predict support of refugee policies better than differences
in national origin, especially for individuals who have strong pre-existing biases against
refugees in general.
H4) Empathetic media about Christian refugees will encourage citizens to support open
refugee policies more than media that references Muslim refugees, regardless of the refugees’
national origin.

Experimental Procedure

In order to test these hypotheses, I conducted a survey experiment on a sample of
UK residents. Preliminary results for this experiment come from an online survey performed on Prolific Academic, a UK-based online platform similar to Amazon Mechanical Turk that allows researchers to convenience sample a large and varied, though not
necessarily representative, segment of the UK population (Peer et al. 2017). When used as
response pools for experimental studies, online crowdsourcing markets such as these are
known to yield results that are as valid as results obtained in laboratory or field experiments (Horton et al. 2011; Berinksy, Huber, and Lenz 2012). I fielded the experiment in
September 2017 with a group of 1,421 adult UK residents. A quota mechanism along with
block randomization by gender ensured there would be a balanced gender distribution
across the entire sample and within treatment conditions. More details about the demographic characteristics of the sample are included in Appendix 1.
Successfully testing Hypothesis 4 requires a measure of outgroup antipathy, since
emotional responses should depend in part on those pre-existing attitudes. To do this,
respondents answered three questions asking them to rate, on a seven-point scale,
whether they agreed or disagreed with a statement, such as “Refugees are more prone to
violence than other groups.” The statements were taken from a larger set asked by Gubler
et al. (2016) and are included in Appendix 2.
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These statements were presented in random order at the beginning of the survey.
To minimize social desirability bias, the questions began with the statement, “There
are no right or wrong answers to these questions. We’re simply interested in your honest responses.” In order to minimize priming effects from these statements that might
interfere with the treatments, the respondents completed a number of other questions
on unrelated issues before receiving the treatment or control articles and answering the
remaining questions of this survey.
Respondents also answered a battery of standard questions measuring political psychological characteristics. These questions are primarily taken from the 2015 American
National Election Survey (ANES) and the British Election Study and include measurements of political party affiliation, political ideology (left/right), interest in politics, egalitarianism, and authoritarianism (this last is presented through questions about values in
child rearing).
Following these questions, respondents read either a news article that discussed a
refugee family that resettled in London (the experimental treatment) or an article that
discussed the nutrition value of fruit juice (the placebo control). Random assignment
determined which article respondents read. Presenting the information about the refugees as a news article was done to mimic a real-world context in which UK residents
might encounter similar humanizing appeals.
There were six versions of the treatment article, each of which varied the family’s
national origin and religion following a 2 × 3 design (Syrian Muslim, Syrian Christian,
Syrian no religion, Sudanese Muslim, Sudanese Christian, Sudanese no religion). This
allows analysis based on not only national origin but also religion. The no-religion condition only varied the national origin of the refugees, without any information about their
religious beliefs. The refugees’ names also varied to match the families’ ethnic origins.
Sudan and Syria were chosen as the countries of origin due to their relevance in
the British context and the similarity of the political situation in both countries. Britain
has received a substantial number of refugees from both countries in recent years (UK
Home Office 2017), and both countries have dealt with bloody civil wars that have
received substantial recent coverage from UK and international news media. Besides
this, the two countries have similar levels of average income and education and are
equally distant from the UK, helping us to discard the possibility that respondents’
assumptions about those characteristics will influence their responses. Importantly, for
the sake of treatment credibility, Sudan and Syria both have populations of Christians
and Muslims. Crucially, the ethnic and racial makeup of these countries is distinct, with
most Sudanese asylum seekers being of African origin, while Syrian refugees are generally Arab. These characteristics allow us to test Hypotheses 1 and 2 without large
concerns of confounding variables.
All other characteristics of the family remained constant in all six treatments.
Respondents learned the refugee family had close family members that were killed and
abducted during war in their home countries, had lost their material possessions, had
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ing these questions, respondents responded to a battery of questions measuring their
demographic attributes.
As a manipulation check, respondents answered two questions at the end of the
survey (after completing items measuring their emotions, attitudes, and behavior) that
asked them to identify the family’s religion (from a list of options in random order
including Muslim, Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, or none) and nationality (from
a list including Syria, Sudan, and some additional distractor options). This allows me to
ensure that respondents were truly cognizant of the refugees’ religion and nationality
as they read the article. Results showed that 81.4 percent of treated respondents correctly remembered the religion and 85.5 percent correctly remembered the nationality
of the refugees. This suggests that the manipulation was successful.
The end of the survey included a debriefing disclaimer informing individuals in
the treatment groups that the religion and national origin of the family they read about
may have been modified. All respondents also received a disclaimer that no message
to their MP would actually be sent and that the question was for survey purposes only.
Individuals received the debriefing material after all other data had been collected.
After data collection, successful randomization was confirmed using Wald tests
to search for significant differences between treatment groups for all demographic and
psychological characteristics (see Appendix 1 for details). Results show no systematic differences across treatment groups beyond what would be expected by random
chance. In order to construct the empathy and dissonance dependent variables, factor
analysis with varimax rotation of the fifteen emotion variables yielded two unambiguous factors (empathy and dissonance), which corresponded to my a priori expectations.
Details on the factor loadings for the emotions outcomes are available in Appendix 1.
Each of the antipathy, dissonance, and empathy scales were rescaled from zero to one
for ease of interpretation. The opinion measure was also rescaled from zero to one.

Results

Before sequentially discussing the treatment effects on empathy, opinions, and
political behavior, it will be useful to discuss some details about the outgroup antipathy measure, since it is used as the basis for conditional analysis of all three outcomes.
Responses to the outgroup three antipathy questions yielded an approximately
normally distributed index with a mean of .466, a standard deviation of .213, and Cronbach’s alpha of .644. The somewhat low internal consistency of this scale, although not
substantially different from typical standards, is understandable given that it is composed of only three questions taken from a larger index.
For ease of interpretation, and to avoid imposing a linear form on the relationship of the outcomes with antipathy, interaction effects with antipathy in the subsequent analysis are estimated with conditional effects models that separate the sample
by antipathy level. In these models, high antipathy indicates an index score above .75
(N=130), mid antipathy includes index scores less than or equal to .75 but above .25
(N=1061), and low antipathy indicates an index score of .25 or less (N=230). Although
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the smaller sample size of individuals with high outgroup antipathy is somewhat
problematic for identifying treatment effects within this group, I show below that significant differences are still visible. Regression results that treat the antipathy variable
as continuous show the same patterns as the conditional effects models. Expected
values plots for the continuous models are available in Appendix 1.
Note that the statements used to generate the present results referred to “refugees” in general; respondents were not asked to elaborate on which assumptions, preconceptions, or suppositions guided their answers to the questions that made up the
index. It will be up to future research (including an already-planned extension of this
study) to delve more deeply into how British citizens define refugees as an outgroup.

Figure 1: Mean Anthipathy Levels by Party

As a somewhat newer measure, it will be useful to compare outgroup antipathy
with other political psychological indices. In this sample, outgroup antipathy correlates positively with authoritarianism (ρ = 0.375) and ideology (ρ = 0.426, where the
variable increases from left to right) and negatively with egalitarianism (ρ = -0.363).
Adida et al. (2017) found that reactions to refugee policy differed by party in the U.S.;
Figure 1 shows that within the UK context, antipathy levels also vary with party affiliation, with left-leaning parties showing less antipathy than right-leaning ones.
Treatment Effects on Emotions
Overall, reported empathy increased for individuals who had read the empathetic
media article, as predicted by H1. H2, which deals with the opinion and behavior
outcomes, is discussed in the next sections. As expected from H3, the strength of the
treatment varied according to citizens’ levels of prior outgroup antipathy. Figure 2
shows the expected values of empathy for each religious treatment condition for both
the overall sample and conditional upon levels of prior antipathy. Figure 3 similarly
reports the expected empathy values by nationality treatment condition. Regression
tables for these and all following figures are provided in Appendix 1. Results show that
low-antipathy individuals experienced the largest treatment effects, while mid-antip153
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athy individuals saw milder but still significant increases in empathy. High-antipathy
individuals’ levels of antipathy were not distinguishable from the control.

Figure 2: Expected Values of Empathy by Religion Treatment

Figure 3: Expected Values of Empathy by Nationality Treatment

While Hypothesis 4 predicted differing treatment effects by religion for the opinion outcome, even in the empathy outcome we begin to see indications of religious bias.
These differences are not apparent when observing the sample overall, nor are religious
differences significant for low- and mid-antipathy individuals. Nevertheless, as shown in
Figure 2, high-antipathy individuals’ feelings of empathy are lower after reading about
Muslim refugees. None of the three religious treatments is statistically different from
the control for this subgroup. However, the Muslim treatments elicit significantly lower
empathy than Christian treatments (P<0.007) and treatments where religion is not mentioned (P<0.022). Interestingly, this more detailed analysis also shows that treatment may
not have been completely ineffective for the high-antipathy group: The coefficient for the
Christian and no religion treatments was positive. The difference between the Christian
treatment and the control group nearly attained established significance levels (P<0.109)
and may have reached established benchmarks had a larger number of high-antipathy
individuals been surveyed.
Further analysis tested whether the refugees’ religion or nationality affected feelings
of empathy. As shown in Figure 3, there are no significant differences between Syrian and
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Sudanese treatments vis-à-vis the control, regardless of the respondents’ antipathy level.
Consistent with the expectations of H4, refugee nationality does not seem to affect significantly respondents’ feelings of empathy in response to the treatment article.
Before continuing to the opinion outcome, I provide some basic analysis of reported
dissonance in order to explore at least minimally the mechanisms behind the lack of
treatment effects for high-antipathy individuals. Figure 4 shows expected values plots for
each treatment condition and the control. As happened for empathy, treatment increased
feelings of dissonance overall, although to a much milder degree than it did for empathy. Treatment increased empathy by about .27 points on the empathy scale but did not
surpass an increase of .11 points on the dissonance scale. The significance of the findings
decreased for low-antipathy individuals in Muslim treatment conditions and highantipathy individuals in Christian treatment conditions. In other words, high-antipathy
individuals felt no significant increase in distress when reading about Christian refugees
but did feel this distress when reading about Muslim refugees. This pattern was reversed
for low-antipathy individuals. The fact that all individuals, regardless of their level of
prior antipathy, felt relatively similar levels of dissonance leaves open the possibility that
respondents at either end of the antipathy scale are reporting the same emotions for different reasons. I discuss this possibility further in the discussion section.

Figure 4: Expected Dissonance Levels

Treatment Effects on Opinions
Figure 5 shows expected values for opinions on refugee policy in the UK by religion and antipathy level. H2a predicted that empathetic media appeals would also affect
respondents’ opinions about refugee policy in addition to producing empathy itself. Supporting this expectation, results show a slight, yet significant, shift in public opinion away
from reducing refugee intake.
H3 predicted conditional effects according to prior antipathy. Subdividing analysis by antipathy group, we see basically the same patterns for opinions as were visible
for the empathy outcome, consistent with H3. Low-antipathy individuals shifted their
already-welcoming opinions toward admitting even more refugees in response to all
treatments. Mid-antipathy individuals also saw treatment effects on opinion but only for
individuals who read about Christians or refugees without a specified religion; Muslim
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treatments generated null effects compared to the control. High-antipathy individuals
advocated a drastic reduction in refugee intake regardless of which article they read.
Differences between the treatment groups are not significant for this subset of respondents, but average opinions in the Muslim treatment are lower than for the other treatment groups, just as they were for empathy.

Figure 5: Expected Opinion Levels

The lack of opinion change in the Muslim treatment condition for high- and midantipathy individuals provides evidence of the Islamophobic religious bias anticipated
by H4. However, the fact that these differences were significant for the large group of
mid-antipathy individuals contrasts with the observations for empathy and also suggests that anti-Muslim bias extends far beyond just a small segment of the population.
Utilizing the same analytical strategy as for the empathy outcome, I found that refugee
national origin was not a significant factor in changing citizens’ opinions. As shown in
Figure 6, the expected values of the opinion index for the Syrian treatments are virtually

Figure 6: Expected Opinion Levels by Refugee Nationality
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identical to those of the Sudanese treatments, regardless of respondents’ levels of prior
outgroup antipathy.
Treatment Effects on Behavior
With regard to the behavior outcome, by far the most common choice for responding
citizens was not to take action on the proposed bill to allow admittance to refugees’ families. Overall, 56.3 percent chose not to send a letter to their parliamentary representative,
29.9 percent chose to send a message in support of the bill, and 13.8 percent chose to voice
their opposition to the bill. Because the behavior measure allowed for three potential
outcomes, analysis was performed using multinomial logistic regression, with no action
being the baseline outcome for comparison. Multinomial logistic regression was used
instead of ordered logistic regression since the three behavior outcomes do not fit onto a
single ordered schema; the support and oppose option both indicate greater willingness
to act than the option to not send any message at all, but they do so in opposite directions
in terms of openness toward refugees.
Figure 7 shows predicted propensities of active support for the pro-refugee bill
for the whole sample and for each antipathy subgroup, as generated from the regression results. Figure 8 shows the propensities of active opposition to the pro-refugee
bill. The results table for these figures is available in Appendix 1. The results show that
the behavior measure is the only outcome variable for which no treatment effects are
distinguishable over the entire sample, contradicting the expectations of H2b. Whether
treatments are analyzed by religion or by nationality, no significant differences in action
propensity are visible relative to the control. Wald tests between the regression coefficients of the nationality analysis, both overall and by antipathy subgroup, show that
supportive action for the Sudanese treatment groups was slightly higher than the Syrian treatment groups. However, this effect only reached the 0.05 significance level when
analysis was conducted on the sample overall (not in analyses divided by antipathy
level). The fact that at least one difference in nationality treatment effects reached
significance for the behavior outcome but not for opinion or empathy indicates that
political behavior is a separate phenomenon from those outcomes that may be susceptible to nation-of-origin priming effects.
As shown, the propensity to actively support the bill increases as outgroup antipathy decreases, while the propensity to actively oppose the bill increases as antipathy
increases. In most cases, however, this pattern only represents a prior attitudes effect,
not a treatment effect interacting with prior outgroup antipathy as was observed in the
empathy and opinions outcomes. The propensity to actively support or oppose the bill
was statistically indistinguishable from the control condition in nearly all treatment conditions, regardless of the degree to which respondents reported prior outgroup antipathy.
However, when treatments are examined by antipathy subgroup, two conditional
effects do emerge, as shown in the conditional effects plots from Figures 7 and 8. First,
an action motivation effect is observed for low-antipathy individuals who read articles
about Muslim refugees or about refugees without reference to religion (Fig. 7). These
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individuals are more likely to request a letter be sent expressing their support for the bill
than individuals who read about Christians or who read the placebo article. No treatment effects are observed for high-antipathy individuals. It is, however, notable that not
a single high-antipathy individual chose to act in support of the bill after reading about
Muslim refugees (this was the only treatment category that generated zero proponents
among an antipathy subgroup).
Second, an action inhibition effect is observed for mid-antipathy individuals who
received a treatment about Christian refugees (Fig. 8). These individuals are less likely to
actively oppose the bill than are mid-level individuals who read about other refugees or
received the placebo article.

Figure 7: Percentage of Sample Choosing to Actively Support Refugees

Figure 8: Percentage of Sample Choosing to Actively Oppose Refugees

Discussion
H1) Empathetic Media Promotes Empathy
While this hypothesis may seem simple, it was by no means a guarantee. Indeed,
roughly 9 percent of individuals (those with high levels of outgroup antipathy) saw
no statistically significant change in empathy vis-à-vis the control. Still, we can reject
the null for this hypothesis with strong confidence, as reading an empathetic article about refugees, on average, produced a highly significant increase of 0.27 on the
empathy scale.
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H2) Empathetic Media Encourages More Open Policy Opinions and Pro-Refugee Action
The behavior results suggest that empathetic treatments are not very effective
in modifying political behavior for the British public at large, but that they can have
some results for subsets of the population. Interestingly, the same treatments that are
the least effective in mobilizing pro-refugee action for low-antipathy individuals (that
is, articles about Christian refugees) are the most effective in dampening anti-refugee
action in the much larger group of individuals with moderate amounts of outgroup
antipathy. More generally, these results suggest that opposition toward refugees in
the general public is best palliated by media that present those refugees as sharing a
dominant cultural trait with the receiving country (in this case, Christianity). Meanwhile, the subset of individuals that are already very open to refugees are most likely
to act when primed with information about refugees that do not match wider societal norms, perhaps out of a feeling that these individuals in a religious or other
minority are the most in need of active advocacy.
H3) Treatment Effects Are Conditional on Pre-Existing Levels of Outgroup Antipathy
Differences in treatment magnitude and significance according to respondents’
levels of prior outgroup antipathy were the most consistent findings across all three
outcome variables. In all cases, the high-antipathy group was the most impervious to
change in aggregate emotions, opinions, or behavior after reading the treatment articles. While the small sample size of high-antipathy individuals means we should not
immediately assume there is absolutely no treatment effect for this group (after all,
mean opinions and empathy in the Christian and No Religion treatment groups were
higher than the control average for this group), any effect is likely to be relatively small.
On the other hand, the largest effect sizes took place among low-antipathy individuals. Within the placebo control group, these individuals had a similar level of latent
empathy levels as any other antipathy group, but they had the highest levels of empathy
among any treated individuals. While this group was already the most likely to favor
open refugee policies in the control condition, they evinced even stronger opinions and
action in favor of refugees after reading the empathetic media article. Predictably, the
results for mid-level antipathy individuals fall in between those of the high- and lowantipathy groups.
These findings support the expectations of Hypothesis 3. However, they do not indicate which (if any) of the mechanisms proposed above are responsible for the patterns we
see here. Feelings of dissonance increased slightly for all individuals, although the patterns were slightly different for low- and high-antipathy groups. Furthermore, the
measurement of dissonance itself does not explain why individuals reacted with those
feelings. The negative feelings reported may have been due to a clash of new information
with individuals’ prior beliefs, but they may also be evidence of distress felt in response
to the difficult situations reported in the treatment articles. Either or both of these pathways may have led to greater feelings of dissonance, and the pathway itself may have
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varied according to prior levels of antipathy. Determining what theory best explains the
phenomena capsulated by Hypothesis 3 will be a task for further research.
H4) Citizen Reactions Show Differences According to Refugee Religion
All three outcomes showed differing treatment effects according to refugee religion,
although these differences were sometimes limited to specific antipathy subgroups.
Overall, the results showed patterns of Islamophobia; high-antipathy individuals felt
significantly less empathy after reading about Muslim refugees than they did after
reading about Christians, and the Muslim treatments were the only treatments that
did not elicit more open refugee policy opinions for the large group of mid-antipathy
respondents (75 percent of the sample). For the behavior outcome, aggregate opposition only decreased for most individuals when confronted with Christian refugees, the
group that shared Britain’s dominant religion.
No significant differences existed between Sudanese and Syrian treatments for
opinions and empathy, although some positive differences were visible in the behavior
measure. These results within the fully crossed experimental treatment design confirm
the suppositions of past authors that religion, not national origin, is indeed the more
salient factor driving public opinion about refugee and immigrant admission (Sniderman et al. 2004; Iyengar et al. 2013).

Conclusion

The results of this study are preliminary, and questions linger over how responses
may have differed if treatments varied additional refugee characteristics or if the experimental sample had been truly representative of the UK population. Furthermore, the
comparison between Sudan and Syria alone does not allow us to determine what underlying opinions about those countries (apart from religion) are at work in influencing
attitudes. Finally, we do not know exactly why respondents’ pre-existing attitudes influence their appraisals of empathetic appeals, although a clear relationship exists. Still, we
can maintain a high level of certainty in attributing causality to the relationship between
empathetic media portrayals and respondent’s feelings, opinions, and actions.
This experiment proposed to address several limitations in the current literature
on attitudes toward refugees and immigrants. First, this study focuses specifically on
refugees, who migrate for different reasons than typical economic immigrants and
may elicit differing responses from citizens in receiving countries (Verkuyten 2004;
Bansak et al. 2016). The results indicate that empathetic media accounts of refugees
raise general feelings of empathy and shift opinions about refugee policy toward
greater admittance. While methods of demonstrating variable mediation are contested and are not presented here (after all, empathy was not manipulated separately
from the treatment itself), it is possible that positive emotions, such as empathy, drive
changes in opinion and political behavior, as other scholars have shown happens with
negative emotions (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Albertson and Gadarian 2015).
Regardless of the psychological pathway this effect takes, these results show that fear
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and anxiety are not the only emotions that can sway the court of public opinion. Purveyors of media that empathizes with or humanizes outgroups may have confidence
that their accounts are persuasive for the general public, although they may have less
efficacy in promoting political action.
Second, by varying both the religion and the national origin of the refugee family
in the treatment prime, this study allows us to distinguish between two cultural factors that may elicit differing responses in receiving citizens. This improves on past
research that has only looked at variation in one or the other of these characteristics.
Notably, accounts about Muslim refugees were the least effective in shifting opinions
about refugee issues. This demonstrates the difficulty that opinion leaders face in combating religious prejudice in public opinion about immigration. It also suggests that,
at least in the UK, the best way to encourage positive perceptions about refugees is to
either emphasize a trait that the refugees share with the local populace (such as Christianity) or to avoid the topic of religion altogether.
Finally, this paper explores how empathetic media appeals about outgroups
influence citizens’ emotions, opinions, and actions. Beyond addressing the general lack
of research on how positive affect influences opinions on refugees, this experiment
allows us to distinguish between the empathy and dissonance felt by experimental subjects and to observe patterns between these feelings and individuals’ prior outgroup
antipathy. These results show that, for the general population, empathetic appeals successfully encourage positive affect and opinions about refugees. However, these
appeals have little effect for people who feel the most negatively about refugees.
This is especially concerning given that people with outgroup antipathy would be
clear targets for empathetic appeals. Thus, while empathetic appeals may preach to
the choir that already supports refugees and even win over a section of the public
without strong set opinions, they are unlikely to change the feelings of the most
prejudiced subset of individuals.
These individuals’ attitudinal intransigence suggests competing policy
responses: On one hand, opinion leaders seeking to promote greater empathy for
refugees might need to recalibrate drastically their messages if they seek to persuade this group. Alternatively, they might develop messages that do not even
attempt to sway the possibly unswayable but instead focus their energies motivating those who already favor refugee resettlement to advocate for them more vociferously (as was shown to be possible in these results). The results of this experiment
were one-time and short-term; it is a possibility that a longer media campaign may be
effective in wearing down hardened opinions against refugee resettlement. However,
regardless of the tack one takes in responding to these individuals, the fact that
a sizable percentage of the British public harbors unyielding prejudicial opinions
about refugees is worrying. Its implications for refugee and immigration policy, as
well as for democratic politics in increasingly diverse Western nations, should be
the topic of further research.
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APPENDIX 1
Additional Results, Tables and Figures

Randomization checks conducted using Wald tests to search for significant differences

in observable traits between all treatment groups. Tests covered all demographic and psychological traits with more than one hundred observations. Of 357 pairwise comparisons, 2.8

percent were significant at the 95 percent level, well within levels of what would be expected
by random chance.

Factor Loadings for the Empathy and Dissonance Scales

Factor analysis with varimax rotation of the fifteen emotion variables yielded two unam-

biguous factors, one which I call empathy (λ = 5.58) and one which I call dissonance (λ = 2.21).

Both of these factors corresponded to my a priori expectations. A third factor, which I call positive
affect, had an Eigen value of 0.80. Using the highest-loading emotions within each factor, I con-

structed two scales. The empathy scale (α = 0.9254) includes the emotions “compassion,” “warm,”

“softhearted,” “tender,” “sympathetic,” and “moved.” The dissonance scale (α = 0.8642) includes
“bothered,” “tense,” “angry,” “anxious,” “afraid,” and “uncomfortable.” Anger was the only emo-

tion included on this scale that was not expected in the experimental design phase. Results for
dissonance change very little with or without the inclusion of anger in the scale.
Regression Results of Treatment Effects by Nationality and Religion

As discussed in the main body of the paper, there are no significant differences between

the Syrian and Sudanese coefficients for any outcome. For supportive action, the Sudanese
treatment effect is statistically significant while the Syrian treatment effect is not. However,

the confidence intervals around the coefficients overlap greatly. Tables 2 and 3 give the OLS

regression results for the empathy and opinion outcomes, respectively. Table 4 gives multinomial logistic regression results for the behavior outcomes. Both overall sample estimates and
conditional estimates are provided.

Tables 5–8 show regression results for models that test for religious treatment effects. Both

overall sample estimates and conditional estimates are provided.
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Table 1: Sample Demographic Characteristics
Gender

%

Marital Status

%

Female

50.46%

Married

38.63%

Male

49.54%

Single

31.81%

Cohabitating

21.62%

Divorced

3.38%

Race
White

92.47%

Black

1.27%

Annual Income

Asian

4.01%

< £20,000

28.80%

Other/Mixed

2.32%

< £40,000; ≥ £20,000

38.24%

< £70,000; ≥ £40,000

24.65%

≥ £70,000

7.30%

Age

36.77 (mean)

Table 2: Nationality Treatment effects on Empathy
VARIABLES

All

High Antipathy

Mid Antipathy

Low Antipathy

Syrian

0.269***
(0.0200)

0.0187
(0.0673)

0.265***
(0.0224)

0.424***
(0.0424)

Sudanese

0.271***
(0.0200)

0.101
(0.0678)

0.245***
(0.0225)

0.469***
(0.0415)

Constant

0.244***
(0.0173)

0.238***
(0.0592)

0.258***
(0.0197)

0.203***
(0.0344)

Observations

1,419

130

1,059

230

R-squared

0.128

0.031

0.123

0.378

OLS Regression with the placebo control used as the comparison condition. Standard errors
in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3: Nationality Treatment effects on Opinion
VARIABLES

All

High Antipathy

Mid Antipathy

Low Antipathy

Syrian

0.0524**
(0.0250)

0.0662
(0.0519)

0.0742***
(0.0267)

0.101**
(0.0439)

Sudanese

0.0664***
(0.0250)

0.0275
(0.0522)

0.0888***
(0.0268)

0.0986**
(0.0430)

Constant

0.433***
(0.0217)

0.0588
(0.0457)

0.404***
(0.0234)

0.667***
(0.0356)

Observations

1,419

130

1,059

230

R-squared

0.128

0.031

0.123

0.378

OLS Regression with the placebo control used as the comparison condition. Standard errors
in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Multinomial Logistic Regression of Behavior on National Treatments
Action to Oppose the Bill
VARIABLES

All

High Antipathy

Mid Antipathy

Low Antipathy

Syrian

-0.284
(0.231)

-0.288
(0.568)

-0.471*
(0.275)

0.405
(0.913)

Sudanese

-0.222
(0.232)

-0.298
(0.571)

-0.395
(0.276)

0.480
(0.914)

Constant

-1.192***
(0.196)

-0
(0.500)

-1.241***
(0.232)

-2.351***
(0.740)

Action to Support the Bill
VARIABLES

All

High Antipathy

Mid Antipathy

Low Antipathy

Syrian

-0.0722
(0.189)

-0.693
(1.287)

-0.0776
(0.234)

0.629
(0.383)

Sudanese

0.205
(0.186)

-1.355
(1.469)

0.207
(0.231)

0.915**
(0.382)

Constant

-0.693***
(0.164)

-2.079**
(1.061)

-0.922***
(0.206)

0.0465
(0.305)

Observations

1,421

130

1,061

230

Pseudo R-squared

0.002

0.005

0.004

0.016

Multinomial logistic regression with “No action” as the omitted outcome category and the placebo
control used as the comparison condition. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5: Religion Treatment Effects on Empathy
VARIABLES

All

High Antipathy

Mid Antipathy

Low Antipathy

Christian

0.272***
(0.0213)

0.112
(0.0693)

0.259***
(0.0237)

0.430***
(0.0464)

Muslim

0.256***
(0.0212)

-0.0450
(0.0721)

0.241***
(0.0237)

0.445***
(0.0443)

No Religion

0.282***
(0.0212)

0.0873
(0.0695)

0.266***
(0.0237)

0.467***
(0.0459)

Constant

0.244***
(0.0173)

0.238***
(0.0583)

0.258***
(0.0197)

0.203***
(0.0345)

Observations

1,419

130

1,059

230

R-squared

0.129

0.070

0.123

0.376

OLS Regression with the placebo control used as the comparison condition. Standard errors
in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Religion Treatment Effects on Dissonance
VARIABLES

All

High Antipathy

Mid Antipathy

Low Antipathy

Christian

0.0771***
(0.0174)

0.0860*
(0.0518)

0.0645***
(0.0213)

0.101***
(0.0348)

Muslim

0.0685***
(0.0173)

0.110**
(0.0539)

0.0591***
(0.0213)

0.0653*
(0.0332)

No Religion

0.115***
(0.0173)

0.136***
(0.0520)

0.0971***
(0.0212)

0.161***
(0.0344)

Constant

0.135***
(0.0142)

0.0858*
(0.0435)

0.159***
(0.0176)

0.0806***
(0.0259)

Observations

1,418

130

1,058

230

R-squared

0.031

0.054

0.020

0.094

OLS Regression with the placebo control used as the comparison condition. Standard errors in
parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7: Religion Treatment Effects on Opinions
VARIABLES

All

High Antipathy

Mid Antipathy

Low Antipathy

Christian

0.0637**
(0.0265)

0.0692
(0.0544)

0.0891***
(0.0282)

0.124**
(0.0478)

Muslim

0.0350
(0.0265)

0.0115
(0.0566)

0.0409
(0.0282)

0.0869*
(0.0457)

No Religion

0.0798***
(0.0265)

0.0537
(0.0546)

0.114***
(0.0281)

0.0918*
(0.0473)

Constant

0.433***
(0.0217)

0.0588
(0.0457)

0.404***
(0.0233)

0.667***
(0.0356)

Observations

1,419

130

1,059

230

R-squared

0.008

0.021

0.020

0.030

OLS Regression with the placebo control used as the comparison condition. Standard errors
in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Multinomial Regression of Behavior on Religious Treatments
Action to Oppose the Bill
VARIABLES

High Antipathy

Mid Antipathy

Low Antipathy

Christian

-0.369
(0.249)

-0.201
(0.592)

-0.661**
(0.303)

0.454
(0.965)

Muslim

-0.266
(0.247)

-0.511
(0.619)

-0.364
(0.291)

0.560
(0.968)

No Religion

-0.126
(0.246)

-0.211
(0.597)

-0.292
(0.293)

0.272
(1.054)

-1.192***
(0.196)

-7.37e-06
(0.500)

-1.241***
(0.232)

-2.351***
(0.740)

High Antipathy

Mid Antipathy

Low Antipathy

Constant

All

Action to Support the Bill
VARIABLES

All

Christian

-0.0994
(0.200)

-1.012
(1.473)

-0.0502
(0.246)

0.454
(0.416)

Muslim

0.0504
(0.198)

-14.22
(772.1)

-0.0551
(0.247)

0.955**
(0.411)

No Religion

0.252
(0.197)

-0.272
(1.293)

0.295
(0.242)

0.894**
(0.424)

-0.693***
(0.164)

-2.079**
(1.060)

-0.922***
(0.206)

0.0465
(0.305)

Constant
Observations

1,421

130

1,061

230

Pseudo R-squared

0.003

0.018

0.005

0.020

Multinomial logistic regression with “No action” as the omitted outcome category and the placebo control used as the comparison condition. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Linear Analysis of Treatment Interactions with Prior Outgroup Antipathy
Linear analysis of treatment effects by refugee nationality shows the same patterns as condi-

tional analysis. No significant differences in response to Syrian and Sudanese refugees are visible.
For supportive action, the Sudanese treatment effect is statistically significant while the Syrian treat-

ment effect is not. However, the confidence intervals around the coefficients overlap greatly. Table

9 gives regression results for all three outcome variables. Figure A1 shows the expected values for

empathy across all antipathy levels. Figure A2 shows the expected rates of support across all antipathy levels.

166

RASBAND
Table 9: Linear regression of national treatment effects on Empathy,
Opinion, and Political Behavior
Behavior Outcomes
VARIABLES

Empathy

Opinion

Action to Oppose

Action to Support

Antipathy

0.111
(0.0701)

-0.833***
(0.0742)

5.032***
(1.190)

-3.527***
(0.875)

Syrian

0.561***
(0.0421)

0.123***
(0.0445)

0.00956
(0.876)

0.659
(0.443)

Sudanese

0.549***
(0.0417)

0.118***
(0.0441)

0.283
(0.878)

1.325***
(0.450)

Syrian × Antipathy

-0.617***
(0.0826)

-0.0965
(0.0874)

-0.719
(1.390)

-1.445
(1.057)

Sudanese ×
Antipathy

-0.608***
(0.0827)

-0.0953
(0.0875)

-1.003
(1.404)

-2.541**
(1.076)

Constant

0.194***
(0.0354)

0.808***
(0.0374)

-3.991***
(0.743)

0.665*
(0.362)

Observations

1,418

1,418

R-squared

0.266

0.401
0.153

0.153

Pseudo R-squared

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Empathy and Opinion results come from OLS regressions. Behavior results come from a single
multinomial logistic regression with “no action” as the baseline.
Figure A1: Expected Values of Empathy by Refugee Nationality
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Figure A2: Expected Rates of Supportive Action by Refugee Nationality

Results from analysis with antipathy as a continuous variable mirror the conditional analysis

reported in the main body of the paper. Table 10 gives regression results for all outcomes. Treat-

ment increases empathy, but to a decreasing degree as antipathy increases. Treatment also moves
opinions toward supporting greater refugee admission, although anti-Muslim bias is less evident

than in the conditional results. Null treatment effects are observed for opposing action to the refugee

bill, but significant effects from the Muslim and no religion treatments are visible for supporting
action. A negative interaction effect between the Muslim treatment and prior antipathy suggests

that, when considering Muslim refugees, low-antipathy individuals are the most likely to actively
support refugee admission, while high-antipathy individuals are especially likely to actively oppose

it. Figures A3, A4, and A5 show the expected values for empathy, opinions, and supportive behavior,
respectively.
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Table 10: Linear Regression of Religion Treatment Effects on Empathy,
Opinion, and Political Behavior
VARIABLES

Empathy

Opinion

Action to Oppose

Antipathy

0.111
(0.0701)

-0.833***
(0.0739)

5.032***
(1.190)

-3.527***
(0.875)

Christian

0.530***
(0.0451)

0.146***
(0.0476)

-0.439
(0.954)

0.713
(0.484)

Muslim

0.573***
(0.0444)

0.116**
(0.0468)

0.728
(0.925)

1.177**
(0.479)

No Religion

0.558***
(0.0447)

0.101**
(0.0472)

0.164
(0.932)

1.106**
(0.485)

Christian × Antipathy

-0.551***
(0.0886)

-0.131
(0.0935)

-0.0967
(1.504)

-1.726
(1.160)

Muslim × Antipathy

-0.685***
(0.0876)

-0.147
(0.0924)

-1.847
(1.483)

-2.560**
(1.149)

No Religion × Antipathy

-0.595***
(0.0881)

-0.0100
(0.0930)

-0.688
(1.481)

-1.753
(1.143)

Constant

0.194***
(0.0353)

0.808***
(0.0373)

-3.991***
(0.743)

0.665*
(0.362)

1,420

1,420

0.155

0.155

Observations

1,418

1,418

R-squared

0.269

0.406

Pseudo R-squared

Action to Support

Figure A3: Expected Values of Empathy by Refugee Religion
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Figure A4: Expected Values of Opinions by Refugee Religion

Figure A5: Expected Rates of Supportive Action by Refugee Nationality
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APPENDIX 2
Question Wording and Treatments
Outgroup Antipathy Measure

The following three questions were interspersed with distractor questions on other issues and

then used to compose the outgroup antipathy scale. Respondents could answer using a Seven-point
Likert scale ranging from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree.”

Below are a number of statements that you may or may not agree with. Please indicate to what

degree you agree or disagree with each statement. There are no right or wrong answers to these
questions. We’re simply interested in your honest responses.

● Refugees are more prone to violence than other groups

● Providing increased opportunities (jobs, education) for refugees in the UK means decreasing
opportunities for other residents.

● Refugees have moral values and customs from which UK residents could learn.
Treatment Articles

The following article was shown to individuals in the Syrian Christian treatment. In Suda-

nese treatments, all instances of “Syria,” “Syrian,” and “Homs” were replaced with “Sudan,”
“Sudanese,” and “Karmuk,” respectively. In Muslim treatments, all instances of “Christian,” were

replaced with “Muslim,” or, in the eighth paragraph, “Islamic.” All instances of “Jesus,” “church,”

and “Bible” were replaced with “Allah,” “mosque,” and “Quran,” respectively. In the no religion
treatments, all religious vocabulary, along with the two sentences in the eighth paragraph that

detail the family’s worship practices, were omitted. Names varied in all treatments in order to
realistically match names common within each religion and national community.

Please carefully read the following news article. You will be asked questions later about its

contents:

“How one Christian refugee family from Syria is starting over in London”
Susanna Assali, a recently arrived Christian refugee, talks about what happened to her

brother in Homs, Syria. He was pulled over at a military checkpoint, accused of being an antigovernment activist, she says. He was tortured and nearly killed.

Her husband, Yakob Olikara also has his reasons — what happened to his brothers. One was

killed by a landmine. Another brother went missing.

“We were looking in the hospitals and police stations,” he says. “All of a sudden, a friend of

ours called and he said, ‘There’s someone on the street who looks like your brother.’” It was. His

brother had been tossed on the street dead, bound by his hands and feet. He worked at a sugar
factory when Syrian soldiers — arbitrarily, Olikara says — rounded him and others up, suspecting

them of being on the wrong side of the civil war. Olikara says his brother stayed clear of politics,
but the violence is indiscriminate.

The next day, the couple fled with their young children.

Now, everything’s different. In February, they arrived in London. Their journey was long,

three years in all, after living in a refugee camp in Jordan. There were numerous interviews and
security checks until, finally, they got word that they would be resettled in the United Kingdom.
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“It’s utter and pure luck,” says Karen Thompson, executive director of the International Rescue
Committee (IRC) in London.

Olikara says he and his family would have been happy anywhere they felt safe. “Sweden,

the United States, Britain, wherever. We are so thankful to be here,” he says. The couple says they
believe Jesus has helped them to make this new life possible.

The family’s only material possessions from Syria are a few photos. The couple’s 9-year-

old daughter, Sara, keeps them tidy in a small album. Pictures show the relatives left behind:
Assali’s mom and her two brothers, who are disabled and can’t make the journey out of Syria.

It’s a reality that weighs on the parents, but, like other Syrian Christian refugees,

they’re trying to focus on building a life here. They attend services regularly at their local
church, and this has helped them make friends who share their Christian faith. They also
enjoy studying the Bible once a week with other members of their community.

Olikara, who was a farmer and truck driver before, got a job fast as a cook at a local

restaurant. The family also wants to meet people, and people here want to meet them. Their

neighbor, Jared Park, who stopped by their flat on a recent afternoon, remembers seeing the

family when they first moved in. “They’re lonely,” says Park “They don’t know anybody
around here. They don’t have the language. Nothing, nothing.”

But both parents say they want to return to Syria one day, when it’s stable. Where they will

live, though, is another question. They just got bad news about their home. “I received some
pictures. Destroyed,” says Olikara.

So they’re focused on being here, and exploring the countryside in the family’s first big

purchase: a mini-van. A friend at their Christian church gave them a deal.

Tomorrow, Olikara takes the driver’s test. It’ll be a challenge for him, but nothing com-

pared to what he and his family have survived.
Placebo Control Article

The following article was shown to all individuals in the control condition.
Please carefully read the following news article:
“Will 100% fruit juice make your child gain weight?”
Sugar can easily sneak into the diet, both for you and for your child, even through 100% fruit

juices.

Many health experts have even expressed concerns that the content of naturally occurring sug-

ars in such juices can have negative health effects on children, such as increasing the risk for obesity.

The relationship between 100% fruit juice consumption and weight gain has been analyzed in

a study published in the journal Pediatrics on Thursday.

The study suggests that drinking 100% fruit juice is associated with a slight amount of weight

gain in children 6 and younger who have one serving a day, but no association was found for children 7 and older who have one serving a day.

Yet the study has some limitations, and it recommends drinking 100% fruit juice only in

moderation.
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“I think caution is definitely in order and that when possible, parents should give whole fruit

to kids, instead of fruit juice,” said Dr. Brandon Auerbach, a primary care physician and instructor
at the University of Washington’s Division of General Internal Medicine in Seattle. “Water or low-fat
unsweetened milk are other good alternatives to 100% fruit juice.”

Auerbach, lead author of the new study, said he is the parent of a 7-month-old boy who soon

may be offered fruit juices in day care and at school.

“I share the concern that 100% fruit juices have a lot of sugar, even though it’s naturally occur-

ring sugar,” he said. “There are other health concerns about drinking 100% fruit juice, besides weight
gain, especially related to risk of cavities and risk of future metabolic syndrome or diabetes.”

The study was a systemic review and meta-analysis of eight previous observational studies on

100% fruit juice consumption and weight gain among children, based on their body mass indexes
or BMI.

The analysis showed that consuming 100% fruit juice was slightly associated with weight gain

in children 1 to 6 years old, but not enough to potentially harm health, Auerbach said.

The researchers found that in children ages 1 to 6, consumption of one daily serving was associ-

ated with a weight gain of 0.3 pounds or less over one year. In children 7 and older, 100% fruit juice
was not independently associated with any weight gain.

“I was somewhat surprised by the results, given that some types of 100% fruit juice have com-

parable amounts of sugar as regular soda,” Auerbach said.

He added, however, that the study certainly had some limitations.

“Although we combined evidence from the best available research, the studies were not ran-

domized controlled trials,” Auerbach said. “We did not examine other important health outcomes
besides weight gain, such as diabetes risk, because too few studies exist on this topic in children.”

The American Academy of Pediatrics recommends that children ages 1 to 6 drink no more than

4 to 6 ounces of 100% fruit juice a day. For children 7 to 18, juice intake should be limited to 8 to 12
ounces, or 2 servings, per day.

It’s not recommended to give fruit juices to infants, Auerbach said. He concluded, “Our study

findings support the current guidelines of the American Academy of Pediatrics on 100% fruit juice
consumption.”

As for adults, the US Dietary Guidelines for Americans recommend drinking no more than one

cup, or 8 ounces, of 100% fruit juice a day.
Behavior Measures

The procedures section of this paper details the administration of the emotion and opinion

outcomes. The following gives the exact wording of the behavior question:

There is currently a bill proposed before Parliament that would allow family members of refugees to enter or remain in the United Kingdom. The bill would also make available legal aid for

these family reunion cases. Would you like us to send an email message to members of Parliament indicating either your support or opposition to this reform?
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The text of the e-mail would read:
Dear MP,
It has come to my attention that a bill, the Refugees (Family Reunion) (No. 2) Bill, has been

proposed that will allow refugees’ family members to enter or remain in the UK. I (oppose/
support) this bill and urge you to do the same.
Sincerely,
Your constituent
● Yes, please send a notice indicating my support for admitting the family members of refugees.

● Yes, please send a notice indicating my opposition to admitting the family members of
refugees.

● No, please do not send a notice on my behalf.
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